Summary: According to publicly available information (PAI), the Belarusian military will begin using the indigenously-produced Vostok-3D air surveillance radar in 2024 (as part of the country’s reported acquisition of new weapons systems in support of its expanding relationship with neighboring Russia). In this blog entry, EW Analytics LLC examines how the signal modes of the Vostok-3D radar, which is advertised as a "stealth radar", may make it difficult for Electronic Support Measures (ESM) systems to detect the activity of the radar and to degrade its operation using conventional Electronic Warfare (EW) techniques.

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Summary; This blog entry uses Publicly Available information (PAI) to describe the Iranian implementation of the Russian-built Rezonans-NE Very High Frequency (VHF) radar (referred to as Ghadir in Iran); to include assertions that the Iranian Air Defense force has, in the past, used the Ghadir  to detect  F-35 fighter aircraft flying near the Iranian border. 

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Summary: This blog entry describes a notional Electronic Warfare (EW) concept conceived by EW Analytics LLC that potentially could be used to  counter the type of Artificial Intelligence (AI)  functionality seemingly embedded in Russian-built, Arctic-based "Cognitive Radars" (as intimated in publicly available information (PAI) posted on the Internet).

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Summary:  This blog entry uses publicly available information (PAI) to take the reader from an island in the Barents Sea to an office building in Moscow as part of an investigation by EW Analytics LLC into the claim of the Russian military that it has deployed “Cognitive Radars’’ in the Arctic with embedded Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology  designed to enhance detection of NATO aircraft in that region. 

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Summary: This blog entry uses Internet-accessible Publicly Available Information (PAI) to describe the deployment of Russian-built Pantsir (aka “Shell”) surface-to-air missile (SAM)/anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) gun systems to provide point air defense of the “Arctic Shamrock” set of military installations located across Russia’s “High North” as part of the country’s recent militarization of the region. 

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Summary: In this blog entry, EW Analytics LLC describes how the Russian-built VIP-117M3 Mobile Indicator Post vehicle is used by Russian military Aviation Guidance Points to help guide MiG-31BM interceptors to targets. System capabilities described in the blog were derived from publicly available information (PAI) that is accessible on the Internet and are  presented in the context of an Arctic-based scenario of the near-future. 

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Summary:  This blog entry explores Electronic Warfare (EW)-related content posted on Social Media by an individual who self-describes as a High Frequency (HF) "radio observer" by the name of "Olga H..." and whose stated priority is to monitor Russian Air Force (RuAF) strategic aviation aircraft such as the Tu-95MS bomber.  EW Analytics LLC concludes that "Olga H..." is a timely and credible source of Publicly Available Information (PAI) that can be used  for Situation Awareness (SA) of Russian strategic aviation bomber aircraft operations in the Arctic and  related HF radio communications. 

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ewanalyticsllc@gmail.com

Summary:  This blog entry describes the Internet-enabled use of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data  by  Russian media outlets to report on military aircraft operations in the Arctic. Additional Publicly Available Information (PAI) is presented in this blog entry which addresses whether or not Arctic-based Russian air defense units could also use ADS-B data to track military aircraft of interest. 

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Summary: According to Publicly Available Information (PAI), the Russian Government allowed members of the international press to tour Russia’s furthest north military installation in May of 2021. This facility is referred to as the “Arctic Trefoil” and is collocated with Nagurskoye Airbase, which recently began to house MiG-31BM fighter/interceptor aircraft. The tour included a visit with "Captain Ivan ..." who was identified as the deputy commander and senior engineer of the radar company that is adjacent to the “Arctic Trefoil”.  This blog entry uses PAI to try and corroborate what "Captain Ivan ..." told the press about daily radar operations at Nagurskoye Airbase and the support his radar company provides to the Aviation Guidance Point at the airbase which  directs  MiG-31BM aircraft to targets in Arctic airspace.

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Summary:  This blog entry uses Publicly Available Information (PAI) accessible on the Internet to examine why the Russian-built PRV-13 radio altimeter, aka Height Finder (HF) radar,  that first came on the scene in the 1970s, was an early target in the war in Ukraine in 2022 and why it may be a  critical node  in possible future Russian air combat in Arctic air space.

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Summary: Related to its on-going militarization of the Arctic, Russia recently submitted a claim to the United Nations (UN) for that organization to acknowledge Russia’s assertion that its continental shelf extends as far north as the North Pole. If approved, this claim will place a large portion of the Arctic under the dominion of Russia and will also impact the Russian Air Force’s (RuAF) use of the High Frequency (HF) portion of the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS). This blog entry uses Publicly Available Information (PAI) accessible on the Internet to provide insights into  HF radio usage by MiG-31BM aircraft and the associated HF radio capabilities of ground-based "Aviation Guidance Points" that support MiG-31BM missions over Russia's "High North".

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Summary: Russia's militarization of the Arctic not only results in the presence of more weapons systems and military installations in the "High North" but also in increased military activity in the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS). Information that is available to the public on the Internet provides insights into how one element of Russia's Arctic militarization effort (i.e., the "Aviation Guidance Point") is equipped to use the EMS to support fighter/interceptor aircraft missions in the Arctic. 

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Summary:  Using information available to the public on the Internet, this blog entry explores the connection between "Air Route Radar Complexes" that have been  deployed at Russian "Aviation Guidance Points" across the Arctic and  Russian fighter/interceptor aircraft operations in that region.  

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